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INTRODUCTION

Back in 1992, artist/entrepreneur Jeff Koons suffered a humiliating
setback when the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
repudiated the suggestion that his reuse of objects from public culture
might constitute a "fair use" defense to a copyright infringement claim.'
Fourteen years later, in a case that again involved a photographer's claim
of copyright infringement, Koons triumphed in the same judicial forum.
What had changed? This Article explores, in particular, one among a
variety of alternative explanations: Koons may have caught the very
leading edge of a profound wave of change in the social and cultural

*
© 2009 Peter Jaszi. Professor of Law and Director, Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual
Property Law Clinic, Washington College of Law, American University; J.D. Harvard Law
School, 1971; A.B. Harvard College, 1968. The author thanks Martha Woodmansee and Mario
Biagioli for their invaluable comments and suggestions.
1.
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
2.
Blanch v. Koons, 467 E3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
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conceptualization of copyright law-specifically, the emergence of an
understanding that is at least incipiently "postmodern" in nature.3
It would be a dangerous undertaking for one trained only in the law
to venture a definition of a term as protean as "postmodernism."'
Nevertheless, I suggest below that several related elements, characteristic
of what might be termed a postmodern cultural attitude, are beginning to
seep into copyright theory and jurisprudence:
" Rejection of claims based on "authority" and "expertise,"
including claims relating to interpretation;
* Suspicion of "grand narratives" designed to justify eternal
verities;
* Skepticism about hierarchical claims about art and culture,
especially those couched in terms of distinctions between "high"
and "low," coupled with a preference for ironic juxtaposition of
unlike materials;
* Turning away from values of stability toward an embrace of flux
and change;
" Recognition that discussions of information access and regulation
are inherently and profoundly political in nature.
II.

COPYRIGHT LAW AND CULTURE

Law has always lagged in its assimilation of new theories and their
associated rhetorics. It would be news if a close reading of some recent
copyright decisions revealed an emergent postmodern take on copyright.
To be clear, the contention here is not that today's jurists are literally
disciples of Lyotard (any more than judges of previous generations
pronounced themselves devotees of Fichte or Wordsworth); rather than
being self-conscious trend followers, lawyers and judges who work on
copyright are participants in a larger cultural conversation, and what they
derive from it ends up influencing copyright discourse in various waysfor good and ill.'
3.
It may be of note that Koons was claimed early as an icon of postmodern art practice.
According to Colin Trodd, it was widely believed that his early work "was part of a postmodern
engagement with the role of culture within post-industrial society, an economic order where
leisure and consumption became processes of great symbolic and material importance." THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO POSTMODERNISM 252 (Stuart Sim ed., Routledge 2d ed. 2005) (1998).
4.
Id. at xii; Gary Aylesworth, Postmodemism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Sept. 30, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodemism.
5.
Felix Guattari, a severe neo-Marxist critic who dismisses postmodernism as "no
philosophy at all," is quoted as characterizing it instead as "just something in the air." See THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO POSTMODERNISM, supranote 3, at 18.
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POSTMODERN COPYRIGHT

Authorship and Modernism

Before proceeding further, here is a brief recap of the story so far,
starting with the self-evident observation that there was no such thing as
premodern copyright on a systemic level. The institution of copyright
and its basic conceptual structures are preeminently "modem," in a
historical/chronological sense. Although this body of legal rules
certainly has a rich prehistory, the institutions and mechanisms that
regulated information production before 1710 (patronage, printing
patents, and so forth) were rooted in understandings of social life that
assumed the primacy and stability of hierarchical authority and
(accordingly) did not reflect the emergence of "possessive individualism"6 and, with it, modernity. The conceptual move that gave us
copyright as we know it was the introduction of the rights-bearing
individual into the scheme of the law. An obvious marker for this
development was the somewhat mysterious appearance of the "author" as
the entity in whom rights initially vested under the Statute of Anne.7 The
emergent figure of the Romantic author-genius rapidly took over a
dominant role in thought and discussion about copyright law in Great
Britain and on the continent-and, ultimately, beyond Europe as well.8
If the rise of the authorship concept is historically and chronologically linked to the emergence of modernity, its durability has been
attributed, at least in part, to a subsequent and mutually supportive
encounter with literary and artistic Modernism. In the Romantic era, one
of the specific roles assigned to creative and scientific genius was the
work of imposing a comprehensible pattern on the evidence of
experience, once religion (and other traditional sources of authority)
could no longer be depended upon for this purpose.9 In the later
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Modernism tightened culture's
embrace of individual self-consciousness as a source of stable meaning
in a world destabilized by migration, global war, new science and
technology, among other disruptions.
6.
See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: FROM
HOBBESTO LOCKE 1-3, 270-71 (1962).
7.
RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT To CopY: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT
OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BRITAIN (1695-1775), at 9-10 (2004); Statute of
Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
8.
Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyjqght: The Metamorphoses of Authorship,'
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 459.
9.
See RICHARD HOLMES, THE AGE OF WONDER, at xv-xvii (2008). Holmes draws out
the connections between the Romantic sensibility in nineteenth-century literature, and the ethos
of a new science, based on the systematizing "genius" of figures like Herschel and Davy, that
emerged during the same period. See generallyid at 163-210, 337-81.
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Foucault observed that authorship is a structure that works to
discipline and limit the meaning of particular texts and discourses.'"
Under conditions of Modernism, the author's function increasingly
served to hold together the elements of an entire information
environment that threatened to fall disastrously apart."
Critical
consumers of culture celebrated individual painters and writers for their
ability to communicate a coherent understanding of otherwise incoherent
happenings. 12 Some sense of this is captured in T.S. Eliot's famous Dial
review of Joyce's Ulysses-one giant of Modernism commenting
(perhaps somewhat self-reflexively) on another-praising Joyce's
"method" (that is, his personal take on Greek mythology) because it had
the effect of "controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a
significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is
contemporary history."13
This extreme valorization of the individual point of view, associated
with both Romanticism and Modernism, helped to further shape a set of
legal attitudes about literary and artistic property. Most specifically, it
contributed to the development of a theme in copyright discourse that
associates the assignment of rights in works not with political choice, but
10. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, What Is an AuthorZ in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY,
PRACTICE 113-38 (Donald E Bouchard ed., Donald E Bouchard & Sherry Simon trans., 1977).
11.
Not only is the "author" a structure well suited to the concerns and premises of
Modernism, but the same assumptions and preoccupations also are reflected in copyright's own
concept of the integrated "work" as a stable object of protection that reflects authorial sensibility.
See id. Because the original is an object that enjoys authority derived from its maker, it can stand
on its own. By contrast, as Walter Benjamin observes, "what withers in the age of the
technological reproducibility of the work of art is the latter's aura." WALTER BENJAMIN, THE
WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF ITS TECHNOLOGICAL REPRODUCIBILITY, AND OTHER WRITINGS ON

MEDIA 22 (Michael Wm. Jennings et al. eds., Edmund Jephcott et al., trans., 2008). Specifically,

the work's stability is threatened by new modes of cultural production:
Thus, the distinction between author and public is about to lose its axiomatic character.
The difference becomes functional; it may vary from case to case. At any moment, the
reader is ready to become a writer. As an expert-which he has had to become in any
case in a highly specialized work process, even if only in some minor capacity-the
reader gains access to authorship. Work itself is given a voice. And the ability to
describe a job in words now forms part of the expertise needed to carry it out. Literary
competence is no longer founded on specialized higher education but on polytechnic
training, and thus is common property.
Id. at 33-34.
12. T.S. Eliot, Ulysses, Orderand Myth, 75 THE DIAL 480-83 (1923), rqprintedin JAMES
JOYCE: THE CRITICAL HERITAGE 268-71 (Robert Deming ed., 1970). Paul K. Saint-Amour points

out that Joyce himself was less than consistent on this point, "oscillat[ing] between embracing
collective authorship and wrapping himself in the mystique and privileges of the individual
genius." THE COPYRIGHTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 159
(2003).
13.

JOYCE, supra note 12, at 270.
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with a preexistent (and therefore invariable) set of natural rights enjoyed
by entitled authors to whom publishers and other "intermediaries" have
successfully assimilated themselves, often to the exclusion of the
interests of the consuming public." In effect, belief inthe claims of
authorship emerged as the grand narrative that justifies and explains this
branch of intellectual property law.
B.

Postmodem Copyight?

If copyright theory and doctrine grew up in conversation with a
particular world view, then the proposition that legal understandings of
copyright could change as that dominant vision is displaced should not
be particularly controversial. But it may prove to be, nonetheless,
precisely because its underlying premise has yet to achieve general
acceptance. The general notion that law is derivative of cultural attitudes
is not revolutionary in itself. Many would accept that our notions of
crime are rooted in religious and ethical beliefs or that the emergence of
human rights law was abetted by the ethos of post-WWII decolonialization. But among intellectual property scholars, there has been some
resistance to claims of cultural influence in the copyright field-at least
in the United States. This is traceable, I think, to a collective, proudly
disillusioned position that copyright, unlike other bodies of law, is really
all about the money; that IP law is simply a machine to generate
innovation through economic incentives; and that lawyers are merely
engineers called on occasionally to tweak or tinker with the mechanism.'5
Such scholars celebrate when (from their perspectives) the machine
works well, and they lament when it runs poorly-but it's all just gears
and switches either way. To some extent this economic/mechanistic
perspective on copyright may have been overtaken by recent events.
More and more, scholars are paying attention to the roles that rhetorics
(whether of "authorship" or "piracy" or even "property" itself) have
played in forming legal discourse-and therefore, law itself.'6 Certainly,
14.

This argument is developed in Martha Woodmansee, Genius and the Copyright, 17

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STuD. 425 (1988), reprinted hmTHE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET:

REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS 49-55 (1994); Jaszi, supra note 8, at 455 (discussing the
concept of authorship).
15.
See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric ofPropery,75 TEX.
L. REv. 873, 894-904 (1997) ("[Romantic authorship does not] tell us very much at either a
theoretical or a predictive level about intellectual property law...."). Lemley proposes as an
alternative that the ills of the field are the result of an inappropriate application of Chicago School
law-and-economics movement theory to mental productions. Id at 897-98.
16.
See Woodmansee, supr note 14, at 42-47; Neil W. Netanel, Why Has Copyright
Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in 6 NEw DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Fiona Macmillan

ed., 2008); Hughes, Justin, Notes on the Origin of Intellectual Property- Revised Conclusions

110
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the "copyright wars" of the 1990s have given us new reason to appreciate
how effectively the emotive tropes of individualism can be mustered in
support of particular policy objectives. After all, the present account of
"postmodern copyright" may find favor where the original "critique of
authorship" did not.
III. ROGERS V KOONS
In any event, the objective here is not to refight old battles, but
rather to suggest that, once again, copyright law has struck up a
conversation with the general culture and that there are signs that this
new discursive connection may prove consequential. And that brings the
focus back to Jeff Koons, his art, and his litigations-beginning with
Rogers v Koons, about which I first wrote seventeen years ago'-a
decision that tells the story of an image's rise from humble beginnings as
a homely semiposed photo of a couple and their dogs to its apotheosis as
a monumental and somewhat disquieting larger-than-life sculpture,
included (along with other monumentalized kitsch) in Jeff Koons's
highly successful "Banality Show."8 In what follows, I will offer a
modest revision of my previous take on that fascinating case. Back in
1992, my commentary on the Second Circuit decision emphasized the
importance of the case as it demonstrated persistence of "Romantic"
authorship--the influential conceptualization of the deserving creator of
culture as an inspired original genius entitled not only to ownership of,
but also to a broad scope of protection over, his or her productions.'9
I argued then that Jeff Koons lost on his fair use defense in large
part because he failed, or refused, to conform to the stereotype of the
serious, dedicated creator around which our copyright law increasingly
came to be organized from the early nineteenth century on.2° By contrast,
artist-photographer Art Rogers, who was bracketed with Ansel Adams by
Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Cardamone, was portrayed as a
complete artist who "makes his living by creating, exhibiting,
publishing[,] and otherwise making use of his rights in his ... works. 2 '
Conversely, Koons came off as a money-mad opportunist (with a
and New Sources (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal
Studies, Working Paper No. 265, 2009), availableathttp://ssrn.com/abstract-1432860.
17. Peter Jaszi, On theAuthorEffect ContemporaryCopyrightand Collective Creativity,
in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 28, 4148 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).
18. Id.
19.
Id at 42-44.
20. Rogers v. Koons, 960 E2d 301, 303-04 (2d Cir. 1992).
21.
Id at 304.
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background in commodities trading, no less) who did not even personally
execute the projects he conceived.22 Technically, the argument was
framed as a case about the applicability of "parody" fair use, but in fact, I
argued then, something rather different was going on.23 The judge left no
doubt about how he viewed the defendant's moral and aesthetic fitness:
The copying was so deliberate as to suggest that the defendants
[Koons and his dealer] resolved so long as they were significant players in
the art business, and the copies they produced bettered the price of the
copied work by a thousand to one, their piracy of a less well-known artist's
work would escape being sullied by an accusation of piracy24
In other words, Koons was not qualified to invoke a defense that was, at
its base, rooted in a twist on Romantic authorship.
Looking back, it seems possible that something more (or, at least,
slightly different) may have been at work as well, and that the opinion
also could be understood as evidence of the persistent influence of
Modernist thought on copyright law of the late twentieth century. Art
Rogers is a recognizable modern maker with a gift for creating real art
from common materials.25 By contrast, according to Judge Cardamone,
all the earmarks of Modernist high culture-the seriousness, the
integrative stance, the suspension of temporal morality-were
conspicuously absent from Koons's insouciant and even trivial
"performance" in "String of Puppies": Jeff Koons was not just a
nonauthor, the court's opinion suggests, but a "bad boy" disgrace to
Modernist values and attitudes-although, we suspect, one who is (or
was) proud of that stance. 6
In arriving at his characterization of Koons, Judge Cardamone
relied on a New York Times article by Michael Brenson. 7 The pertinent
part of that article declared that
[Koons's] art is largely strategic. Images have been appropriated from
photographs of popular culture and collaged together into spanking new
commodities. They were made collectively, even anonymously, by
workshops in northern Italy. What seems to matter is not the originality of
the artist, but rather images that belong to an entire culture and that
everyone in that culture can use."
22. Id.at 303-04.
23. Jaszi, supra note 17, at 44-48.
24. Rogers, 960 E2d at 303.
25.
See id. at 304.
26. See id. at 311.
27. Michael Brenson, GreedPlus Glitz, with a Dollop ofInnocence,N.Y TIMES, Dec. 18,
1988, Gallery View § 2, at 41; see also Jaszi, supm note 17, at 43 n.50.
28. Brenson, supm note 27, § 2, at 41.
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Clearly, this view of the source material is not shared by the judge !29
But that was then, and this is now. In this moment, postmodern
sensibility is no longer the special province of cultural critics, if it ever
was. Instead, it is being enacted (often in ways enabled through new
technology) by way of the hacker ethic; hip-hop, remix culture, and other
forms of bricolage; and the DIY movement, to mention only a few
examples. This outlook is so pervasive that it would be surprising if it
had no implications for legal thinking about information regulation.
When this Article returns to the Jeff Koons story, it will be to suggest that
seventeen years later, copyright discourse has begun to reflect, however
tentatively, an attitude of postmodernism.
To be clear, the suggestion is that attitudes have begun to change in
the last several decades; it is not that some aspects of postmodernism
have been anticipated in classic twentieth-century copyright doctrine,
although this may well be the case. In Justice Holmes' famous 1903
dictum in Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co., he pointedly
declined to discriminate between conventional fine art and the very
mundane advertising posters involved in that litigation, which can be
understood as a gesture of premature postmodernism. 31 Jane Gaines and
Brad Sherman, respectively, are right to note that copyright can be a
"great cultural leveler," and that it "refuse[s] to distinguish works of high
and low authorship."'" Generally speaking, however, copyright has held
tightly onto other kinds of Modernist hierarchies--especially the scale
along which more and less "original" artistic productions are valued.32
Conventionally, copyright law has given a special place of pride to work
that originates from either the fertile mind of its maker or as a result of
that mind's interaction with the raw materials of nature.33 The result, of
course, is that merely "derivative" works-those that take preexisting
culture for their material-have been systematically undervalued in the
29. See Rogers, 960 F2d at 309-11.
30. 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("[T]he act however construed, does not mean that ordinary
posters are not good enough to be considered within its scope."); see Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, The Story of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company: On'ginality as a
Vehicle for Copyright Inclusivity, inINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 77-108 (Jane C. Ginsburg
& Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2005).
31.

JANE GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE AND THE LAW 64 (1991);

Brad Sherman, Appropriatingthe Postmodem: Copyrightand the Challenge of the New, 4 Soc.
LEGAL STUD. 31, 56-57 (1995). The further implications of postmodernism for copyright (and IP
in general) were memorably foreseen in Rosemary J.Coombe, Objects of and Subjects of
Property IntellectualPropertyLaws andDemocraticDialogue,69 TEX. L. REv. 1853 (1991), and
Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress'" Considering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43
DEPAUL L. REv. 97 (1993).

32.
33.

See Jaszi, supra note 8,at 460-64.
Id.
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copyright scheme. This attitude, of course, is on prominent display in
Rogers.' Koons's defensive arguments fail, at least in part, because the
culturally referential nature of his sculpture contrasts unfavorably with
the straightforward artistry of Rogers' photo." Whatever the postmodern
potential of copyright may have been, the case demonstrates how far the
copyright system was, in the early 1990s, from its realization.
IV

BLANCH v KOONS

In 2006, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Blanch v Koons, which concerned the artist's incorporation of a portion
of an image known as "Silk Sandals," which had earned the fashion
photographer/plaintiff a $750 commissioning fee, into "Niagara," a
Koons painting in the widely exhibited $2 million, seven-painting
"Easyfun-Ethereal" series.3 6 Once again, Koons's defense was fair use,
but this time it received a far more respectful treatment. The real
indicator of change, however, is found in the specific language employed
by the court on its way to a finding that the use was "transformative" in
that it added value to and fundamentally repurposed the original
photograph." On his way to a conclusion, Judge Sack noted: "The
question is whether Koons had a genuine creative rationale for borrowing
Blanch's image, rather than using it merely 'to get attention or to avoid
the drudgery in working up something fresh.' 38 The court continued
(with considerable deference) by noting Koons's own explanation of why
he used Blanch's image:
Although the legs in the Allure Magazine photograph ["Silk Sandals"]
might seem prosaic, I considered them to be necessary for inclusion inmy
painting rather than legs I might have photographed myself. The ubiquity
of the photograph is central to my message. The photograph is typical of a
certain style of mass communication. Images almost identical to them can
be found in almost any glossy magazine, as well as in other media. To me,
the legs depicted in the Allure photograph are a fact in the world,
something that everyone experiences constantly; they are not anyone's legs
in particular. By using a fragment of the Allure photograph in my painting,
I thus comment upon the culture and attitudes promoted and embodied in
Allure Magazine. By using an existing image, I also ensure a certain
authenticity or veracity that enhances my commentary-it is the difference

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Rogers, 960 E2d at 312.
Seeid at 309-11.
Blanch v. Koons, 467 E3d 244,247-49 (2d Cir. 2006).
See id.
Id at 255.
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between quoting and paraphrasing-and ensure that the viewer will
understand what I am referring to.39

This self-justificatory statement may or may not make sense as an
explanation of why "Niagara" is a critical commentary on popular media
culture. Ultimately, however, its coherence may not matter. What clearly
does matter is that Judge Sacks takes Koons's self-expressed claims as an
interpreter and repurposer of existing content very seriously-so much
so that he is willing to agree that "these are not anyone's legs in
particular" but limbs available for appropriation by someone with a new
angle. He concludes, with a bow to Bleistein:
Although it seems clear enough to us that Koons's use of a slick fashion
photograph enables him to satirize life as it appears when seen through the
prism of slick fashion photography, we need not depend on our own poorly
honed artistic sensibilities.... We conclude that Koons thus established a

"justif[ication for] the very act of [his] borrowing." Whether or not Koons
could have created "Niagara" without reference to "Silk Sandals" we have
been given no reason to question his statement that the use of an existing
image advanced his artistic purposes."
V

TELLING A TALE OF Two KOONS-ROMANTIC AUTHORSHIP REDUX
OR THE RISE OF "TRANSFORMATIVENESS" OR... ?

Clearly, Judge Sacks was prepared to cut Jeff Koons a good deal of
slack.4 So what explains this reasoning and result? What changed over
the years from Rogers to Blanch? Several explanations suggest
themselves.
By far the least interesting is that Jeff Koons has not actually
escaped the grid of Modernist author-based copyright reasoning at all,
but (always an accomplished self-publicist) has merely succeeded in
slotting himself more firmly into it. In other words, the decision
represents the persistence of Romantic authorship rather than hinting at
its senescence. Back in Rogers, Koons was a "player," not an author.42
Now, he's claimed that privileged status with work in the collection of the
Metropolitan and a solo(!) exhibition in the summer of 2008 at the Palace
of Versailles.43 Koons has become fully credentialed as a creative genius,
39. Id.
40. Id. (internal citation omitted).
41.
See id.
42. Rogers v. Koons, 960 E2d 301, 307-10 (2d Cir. 1992).
43. See Jeff Koons Versailles, www.jeffkoonsversailles.com/en/ (last visited Oct. 20,
2009). In announcing this coup, Koons sounds at least somewhat authorial: "It is an honor to
represent contemporary culture within the walls of the Palace of Versailles." Id. For the
controversy surrounding the exhibit, see also Kitsch Trumps Baroque: Koons' Versailles Show
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and (with this understanding) that makes all the difference. The fatal
shortcoming of this explanation is that it does not account satisfactorily
for much of the opinion's actual rhetoric. In fact, the court of appeals'
opinion hardly discussed "authorship" and "originality."w It certainly
does not suggest that fair use analysis is just a matter of weighing
competing authorship claims."
The most technical explanation focuses strictly on shifts in
copyright doctrine during the period between the two lawsuits. When
Rogers was decided, the transformativeness-based approach to fair use
analysis was still a personal project of Judge Pierre Leval and not yet the
law of the Second Circuit or the land.46 Today, transformativeness figures
as a kind of metaconsideration arching over fair use analysis. The
determination of whether a use is transformative or not strongly inflects
(if not dictates) the outcome of at least three, if not all four, of the
statutory factors to which section 107 of the Copyright Act directs
judicial attention.47 It was born in the context of Factor One (the nature
of the use) but has its most dramatic implications for Factor Four (the
effect on the market), with courts (up to and including the United States
Supreme Court) suggesting that copyright owners are not entitled to
expect licensing revenues from "transformative markets." 8 However, the
rise of transformativeness is far from being a self-explanatory or an
autonomous phenomenon. It does not so much explain as it correlates
with the court's approach in Blanch.9 Or, to state the matter differently,
both the hegemony exercised by this legal standard in general and the

Ruffles Feathers in France (Sept. 10, 2008), www.spiegel.de/intemational/europe/0,1518,577388,
00.html.
44. See generallyBlanch, 467 E3d 244.
45.
In the Blanch district court opinion, the judge actually seemed to take a similar
approach, dismissing the "Silk Sandals" photo as (interestingly) "banal rather than creative."
Blanch v. Koons, 396 E Supp. 2d 476, 481-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). But the Second Circuit firmly
rejects this qualitative "comparative" technique. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247-48 (respectfully
describing Andrea Blanch and her work).
46. The transformativeness-based approach was introduced by Judge Pierre N. Leval in
Toward a Fair Use Standar4 103 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1111-17 (1990). Since that time, it has
evolved into the generally accepted meta-criterion in fair use analysis. But see Mitch Tuchman,
Judge Leval' Transformation Standard" Can It Really Distinguish Foul from Fair, 51 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 101 (2003). For the evolution of the standard since 1990, see Peter Jaszi,
Copyight, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 715, 718-22 (evolution of the
standard since 1990); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537
(2009) (systematic analysis of fair use as applied in a wide range of contexts).
47. Jaszi, supra note 46, at 720, 725; 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2009).
48. Jaszi, supra note 46, at 722 (quoting Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley,
Ltd., 448 E3d 605, 614-15 (2d Cir. 2006)).
49. See Blanch,467 E3d at 251-53.
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mode of its application to Jeff Koons in particular may reflect similar
shifts in the cultural positioning of copyright."
VI. POSTMODERN COPYRIGHT

A.

The Second Circuit the Second Time Around

And that brings the argument to what may be the most interesting
explanation of the Second Circuit's revised take on Jeff Koons: that the
rhetorical structure of the Blanch opinion represents a significant move
away from the Modernist author-worship, and an early signal of a
perceptible shift in how courts will increasingly understand the
relationship between author and work in years to come.51 It represents, in
fact, a rejection of the grand narrative of authorship and "author-ity," in
favor of an approach that distributes attention and concern across the full
range of participants in the processes of cultural production and
consumption. 2 As such, it may signal a general loosening of authors'
and owners' authority over, by now, not quite so auratic works, allowing
greater space for the free play of meaning on the part of audience
members and follow-up users who bring new interpretations. 3 If so, this
is a change of potentially profound importance, undermining the stability
of the two concepts at the heart of modern copyright.
Viewed in this way, the Blanch decision suggests that as old
attitudes have been displaced or supplemented by new ones in the
domain of culture, law is (however belatedly) beginning to follow suit.
Specifically, law may be absorbing an attitude of skepticism about fixed
identity and stable point of view-recognizing what has been clear for
some time in arts practice and aesthetic theory: that much like the
natural world, constructed culture is fair game for reinterpretation as

50. See the interesting discussion in Laura Heymann's EverythingIs Transformative: Fair
Use and ReaderResponse, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 445, 460-62 (2008) (contrasting Rogers and
Blanch and suggesting that courts might determine whether a claimed fair use is transformative
by considering whether the defendant's work engages with a different discursive community from
the plaintiff's work).
Professor Heymann's prescription for the improvement of
transformativeness analysis is that courts take into greater account the insights of reader-response
criticism; she finds in Blanch (and other cases cited in her footnote 90) an indication that such a
refined approach may already be at work. Id
51.
See generallyBlanch, 467 E3d 244.
52. Id.
53. Id
54. For some of the difficulties attending the concept of the "work," see Robert H.
Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copynght Infringement and the Fictionof the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 725 (1993).
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"fact[s] in the world," to quote Jeff Koons once again.55 If so, as Laura
Heymann has suggested, these developments will be consequential in the
law of fair use. 6 Among other things, how they play out will profoundly
influence the copyright position of the growing community of fan
fictioneers, vidders, remixers and mash-up artists who are currently
running afoul of the on-line content platforms' take-down policies."
B.

Another Swallow. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios,
Inc.

Obviously, it is risky to take one decision (or even a group of related
decisions concerning a topic such as fair use in appropriation art) as
markers for a trend in copyright thinking. Fortunately, the evidence of
Blanch is not uncorrupted. Consider, for example, recent developments
in the law regulating the liability of technology providers, beginning with
the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Sony Corp. of Amelnca v
Universal Studios, Inc., which embodies a skeptical attitude toward
claims of authority that impinge on audience choice. 8 There, the Court
ruled that home recording and "time shifting" of television programming
constituted "fair use"--and went on to immunize technology providers
from liability for supplying the necessary VCR equipment. 9 It reasoned:
The distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" uses may be
helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative....
Copying a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to fair use than
copying a motion picture. And, of course, not all uses are fungible.... A
teacher who copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is
a teacher who copies for the sake of broadening his personal understanding
of his specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the sake of broadening her
understanding of what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who
copies a news program to help make a decision on how to vote.
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind
person is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an
55. Blanch, 467 E3d at 255. An extended critique of the Rogers decision as failing to
recognize the nature of "postmodem" appropriation art can be found in Lynne A. Greenberg, The
Art ofAppropriation: Puppies,PiracyandPost-Modernism, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1,2333 (1992).
56. Greenberg, supranote 55, at 33; Heymann, supra note 50, at 460-62.
57. For a description of these issues, see Elec. Frontier Found., Fair Use Principles for
User Generated Video Content, http://www.eff.org/issues/ip-and-free-speech/fair-use-principlesusergen (last visited Oct. 12, 2009); Ctr. for Soc. Media, Code of Best Practices for Fair Use in
OnLine Video (May 2009), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/resources/publications/fair use_
inonlinevideo.
58. 464 U.S. 417,454-55,464 (1984).
59. Id. at 453-56.
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example of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose
to entertain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting,
using a VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss
has no productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological
well-being of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer
access to television programming may result in a comparable benefit.60

In other words, the decision puts the controls, so to speak, in the hands of
the end-user, a gesture of empowerment made in defiance of the received
"grand narrative" of copyright law that concentrates authority in the
copyright owner. The Supreme Court's discussion, quoted above, makes
it clear that its analysis is driven by an understanding that its decision is a
necessary intervention into the politics of authority over information-an
essentially postmodem stance.
VII. CARTOONNETWORK LP v CSCHOLDINGSINC.
More recently, the Second Circuit decided CartoonNetwork LP v

CSC Holdings, Inc., a case that determined whether a cable system's
operation of a virtual digital video recorder (RS-DVR) on behalf of its
subscribers involved various violations of copyrights in broadcast

content.6 ' At first blush, this is hardly promising material for a close
reading aimed at detecting a possible shift in underlying assumptions
about the nature of copyright. Certainly, it is a highly technical decision,
addressing (1) whether buffer copies are infringing reproductions,
(2) whether transmission of those copies to users at a time of their
choosing constituted "public performance," and (3) whether the company
has legal responsibility for longer-enduring "playback" copies made on

60. Id. at 454-55. Sonydisplayed a streak of postmodernist self-consciousness in both its
substantive analysis and in the technique of that decision-relying as it did on statutory bricolage
to introduce the patent concept of "staple item of commerce" into copyright. See also Heymann,
supm note 50, at 457 (concluding that under the proposed refinement of transformativeness
analysis, time-shifting might not qualify although it might be considered fair use on other
grounds).
61.
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 455-56.
62. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). Copyright owners receive extra revenue when their
content is accessed through cable systems' "on demand" features but not in cases of viewerinitiated time-shifting. Id. at 124. Interestingly, the parties undertook not to contest the issues of
whether the cable system's activities could give rise to "secondary" (contributory or vicarious)
liability, and whether the "fair use" defense was available. Id Instead, by agreement, the focus
was placed on whether any activities might constitute direct infringement (as, for example, by
reproduction) on the cable system's part. Id. On June 29, 2009, after a failed effort by copyright
owners to persuade the new Solicitor General to weigh in, the Supreme Court declined to hear a
further appeal, and the courts of appeals' analyses are now settled. CNN, Inc. v. CSC Holdings,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009).

2009]

POSTMODERN COPYRIGHT

its own servers.63 But in setting aside the district court's conclusions on
each of these issues, the Second Circuit ran a gauntlet of seemingly
applicable precedents, driven forward by its apparent awareness of what
amounts to core postmodern themes or concerns. '
For example, the panel of judges disposed of the public performance issue by noting that each performance served by the cable system to
subscribers was made by means of a separate copy-finding significance
in the fact that each subscriber's experience of the recorded work was
both formally and substantively distinct from those of others. And in
addressing the question of responsibility for the making of the playback
copy, the court opined:
In most copyright disputes, the allegedly infringing act and the identity of
the infringer are never in doubt. These cases turn on whether the conduct
in question does, in fact, infringe the plaintiff's copyright. In this case,
however,66the core of the dispute is over the authorship of the infringing
Conduct

The court concluded:
In the case of a VCR, it seems clear-and we know of no case holding
otherwise-that the operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses the
button to make the recording, supplies the necessary element of volition,
not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from the
operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR customer
is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a
direct infringer on a different party for copies that are made automatically
upon that customer's command.67
With this new variation on the theme of "authorship," directed not to the
works involved but to the challenged "conduct," the Second Circuit
reenacted the rationale of the Supreme Court's 1984 Sony decision, with
its emphasis on safeguarding private choices about information
consumption. 8
The Cartoon Network decision has been, to say the least, controversial. In particular, critics alleged, with some justification, that in
arriving at its result, the Second Circuit took liberties with statutory
concepts such as the requirement that an infringing copy must exist for
63.
CartoonNetwork, 536 F.3d at 129-30.
64. Id.at 134-40.
65.
Id at 137-39.
66.
Id.at 130 (emphasis added).
67.
Id.at 131.
68.
Id. at 132-33; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
437-42 (1984).
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"more than transitory duration."69 Noting that there are no applicable
precedents to guide a determination of how stable a copy must be in
order to infringe, the court continues:
No bit of data remains in any buffer for more than a fleeting 1.2
seconds.... [E]ach bit of data here is rapidly and automatically
overwritten as soon as it is processed. While our inquiry is necessarily
fact-specific, and other factors not present here may alter the duration
analysis significantly, these facts strongly suggest that the works in this
case are embodied in the buffer for only a "transitory" period, thus failing
the duration requirement.
The liberatory effect of this analysis is considerable. And reasonable as it
may sound, it represents no small exercise of creativity on the part of the
court. The quoted language clearly suggests the possibility that there
exists a range of short-lived information phenomena (some trivial and
others significant) that fall outside the scope of copyright regulation. In
particular, data flows may escape the web of copyright-an outcome that
is reflects a postmodern appreciation and understanding of the instability
and contingency of information objects.
ViiL CONCLUSION

Both the method and the outcome of CartoonNetwork were highly
controversial.7 But the decision seems here to stay. What it, and the
69. Oliver A. Taillieu, Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings. Remote DVR Does Not
Violate Copyright Protections Afforded to Television Program Copyright Holders (Sept. 18,
2008), http://www.lawupdates.com/commentary/icartoon-network-v-csc-holdings_iremote_
dvr does notviolatecopyrightpro; see also Posting of Jeff Neuburger to New Media & Tech.
Law Blog, http://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2008/08/articles/copyright/ram-copying-an-issueof-more-than-transitory-duration/ (Aug. 20, 2008).
70. CartoonNetwork, 536 E3dat 129-30.
71.
Some sense of how controversial the decision was can be gleaned from the Amicus
Brief filed by the Copyright Alliance, an umbrella organization of major copyright industry
companies and associations, urging the Supreme Court to hear the case. Brief for Copyright
Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, CNN, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 E3d 121
(2d Cir. 2008) (No. 08-448), 2008 WL 4887717, at * 17-23. In effect, the Alliance argued that the
Second Circuit (1) had erred in accepting the analogy between the home VCR involved in Sony
and the remote, virtual service offered by Cablevision; (2) had improperly invaded the policymaking province of the legislature; and (3) had made various serious mistakes of law and fact. Id.
at *3-5, 9-10, 13-17. It also foresaw enormous difficulties if the panel's interpretation of the law
were to be applied to various other new technologies, such as "cloud computing":
The copies that users obtain in ...cloud computing models are clearly stable enough to
be used for their intended purpose, but may not exist long enough to satisfy the Second
Circuit's additional "duration requirement" for copyright protection. Thus, the decision
below may call into question the ability of a copyright owner to enter into an
enforceable license for these "fleeting" short-term uses of its works, as well as its
capability to bring infringement actions against those who access these works without a
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other recent decisions discussed here, may signal for the future is another
question. It is too soon to pronounce the death of the Modernist
conception of authority in copyright, or the desuetude of the related
concept of the fixed work. But change may, nevertheless, be underway.

license, or in excess of licensing provisions, solely for the purpose of extracting their
value through making a short term copy.
Id at *16-17.

